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WORLD PUBLISHING CO. v. C.I.R.
process clause, and they have succeeded in narrowing the
ambit of the states to administer their criminal procedures.
In these respects, those "liberal" activist Justices do not
appear to be out-of-step with the political processes of con-
temporary federalism, which no longer permits abuses of
defendants' rights which formerly had been condoned in
the name of state administration of the criminal law, in the
name of an older version of federalism.
Depreciation Of Tenant-Erected Building By
Purchaser Of Fee
World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue'
Pursuant to the terms of a fifty year lease of realty, the
lessee erected a six story building at a cost of more than
$250,000. The lease provided that at its expiration all
buildings and improvements put upon the land by the
lessee were to pass to the lessor. Subsequently, the lessor
sold his entire interest in the property to the petitioner.
After the petitioner purchased the lessor's interest, he
began claiming a deduction for depreciation of the building
by writing off, over the remaining twenty eight years of
the lease, that portion of the purchase price applicable to
the building.2 The depreciation deductions claimed by the
taxpayer were disallowed by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and this ruling was upheld by the Tax Court.3
The Tax Court concluded that depreciation 4 was not allow-
able in this instance since the petitioner's interest in the
building was such that he would not suffer an economic
loss by its physical exhaustion. On appeal the Circuit Court
reversed the Tax Court decision. It held that the taxpayer
could write off that portion of the purchase price allocable
to the tenant erected building by periodic depreciation de-
ductions. The Court pointed out a number of cases that
have denied depreciation on the tenant built improvement
where the taxpayer acquired the fee interest by devise or
inheritance, but distinguished those cases from an acquisi-
tion by purchase.5
'299 F. 2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).2 Petitioner paid $700,000 for the property. The land was appraised at
$400,000 and the building at $300,000. The rent over the fifty year lease
averaged $28,500 per year.8 35 T.C. 7 (1961).
'26 U.S.C.A. (IRC 1954) § 167(a). The 1954 Code is referred to
throughout the note since sections of the 1939 Code applicable to discussion
were not materially changed by the 1954 Code.
' Supra, n. 1, 618-621.
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While the instant case deals with a purchase situation,
the great majority of cases dealing with the problem of
depreciation of a tenant-built improvement by the owner
of the fee have been confined to the situation where the
taxpayer acquired the fee by devise or inheritance. These
cases have been decided on their particular facts, but their
history demonstrates an early conflict between the Tax
Court and the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal.
This conflict has been resolved so as to deny depreciation
to the owner of the fee.
The early Tax Court cases allowed the heir or devisee
to depreciate a tenant-erected building when it was in-
cluded in valuing the decedent's estate for estate tax pur-
poses.6 The rationale of these cases was that a depreciable
basis was acquired by the devisee as an incidence of the
estate tax which was paid on the value of the improved
property.
The Tax Court was subsequently overruled in several
instances. The 5th Circuit reversed the Tax Court when
the evidence indicated that the property valued for estate
tax purposes was not the tenant erected building, but the
cash ground rental value of the land.7 The 9th Circuit, in
the case of Moore v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,8
where the lease was one that would not expire until the
year 2023, again overruled the Tax Court. The Court rea-
soned that no basis existed for allowing the taxpayer to
depreciate a building he would not possess until after the
building's useful life had terminated and its value had been
exhausted. In an 8th Circuit decision,9 the executor of the
lessor's estate was disallowed depreciation where it was
not proved that the building was held "for the production
of income,"'" and where under state law title to the building
would not vest in the lessor until after the expiration of
the lease.
The Court of Appeals' reversal of the Tax Court in the
death situation led the Tax Court to reverse its position
and disallow depreciation on the tenant erected improve-
ment. In so doing, the Tax Court in one instance denied
Moore v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 15 T.C. 906 (1950);
Pearson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 T.C. 851 (1949) ; Currier
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 7 T.C. 980 (1946).
" Pearson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 188 F. 2d 72 (5th Cir.
1951).
8207 F. 2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Note, Lessee-Erected Improvements
Securing Long Term Leases: An Overlooked Depreciation Deduction For
The Landlord, 63 Yale L.J. 872 (1954).
9 First National Bank of Kansas City v. Nee, 190 F. 2d 61 (8th Cir.
1951) ; Anno., 40 A.L.R. 2d 423 (1955).
1026 U.S.C.A. (IRC 1954) § 167(a) (2).
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depreciation on the basis that the taxpayer was only re-
ceiving rental income from the ground alone and therefore
had no interest in the building.1
Depreciation was similarly denied by the Tax Court in
the one case prior to the instant case where a purchase sit-
uation was involved. In disallowing depreciation in Bern-
stein v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue," the Tax Court
concluded that the taxpayer had purchased only a rever-
sionary interest in the building or a right to possess the
improvements upon the termination of the lease. The
Court cited the opinion of the 9th Circuit in the Moore case
as precedent and recognized the principle that there is no
difference with respect to depreciation of a tenant built
improvement on property acquired by purchase and prop-
erty acquired by inheritance. 13 On appeal the Tax Court
decision was sustained by the 2nd Circuit primarily on the
grounds that the facts showed the taxpayer's entire cost
of the property was less than the fair market value of the
land alone.14 Thus, because of the facts in the Bernstein
case, the question of a purchaser's right to depreciate a
tenant-erected building had never been squarely presented
until the instant case.
While the 8th Circuit decision in the instant case allow-
ing the depreciation deduction seems to create a distinction
between the purchase and death situations, precedent for
such a distinction does not appear to come from the case
law or from the Internal Revenue Code. The Code only
makes a distinction between the two situations in the
measure of the basis. 5 Where property is acquired by
devise or inheritance fair market value is the basis,16 while
cost becomes the depreciable basis when property is
purchased. 7
The practical economic effect of allowing depreciation
to the fee owner is to allow two taxpayers, the tenant and
the lessor, to depreciate the same wasting asset at the same
Rowan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 22 T.C. 865 (1954).
'22 T.C. 1146 (1954).
On the theory that no distinction exists between a purchase and death
situation see generally: Lurie, Depreciating Structures Bought Under Long
Term Lease: An Adventure in Blunderland, New York University 18th
Annual Institute on Federal Taxation (1960) p. 43; Rubin, Depreciation of
Property Purchased Subject To A Lease, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1134 (1952).
"Bernstein v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 230 F. 2d 603 (2d Cir.
1956).
26 U.S.C.A. (IRC 1954) § 167(f) provides the basis of depreciation as
being the basis for determining gain from a sale.
26 U.S.C.A. (IRC 1954) §§ 1011, 1014 dealing with basis of property
acquired by devise or inheritance.
1' 26 U.S.C.A. (IRC 1954) § 1012 dealing with basis of property acquired
by purchase.
1963]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
time. Clearly the tenant who erected the building has a
depreciable basis in the property so as to enable him to
recover his costs through depreciation.18  But on what
theory can a purchaser of the lessor's interest in such
property justify a depreciation deduction? 9 He purchased
a right which in the hands of his transferor was not depreci-
able. How can he acquire a greater interest in the tenant
erected building than his transferor had?20 Even if the
consideration paid for the lessor's interest in the property
is in excess of the fair market value of the land alone, how
can this excess be justified as the cost of the building when
at the date of purchase the remaining useful life of the
building is less than the remaining term of the lease?
In the instant case the Court reasoned that the pur-
chaser bought a capital asset, over and above the land
itself, which was said to be separate and distinct from the
lessee's interest in the building. Therefore, in allowing
each to recover their capital expenditures, the Court saw
no duplication. An analogous situation was said to exist
where the tenant, after having fully recovered the cost of
the building by depreciation, purchased his lessor's interest
in the fee.2' Are these situations really analogous? Two
taxpayers are not depreciating the same capital asset at
the same time as in the main case and the tenant is only
writing off the actual cost of the building to himself.
Rather than allow double depreciation as the instant
case has done, it might be better to construe the purchase
of the lessor's interest in the property as a purchase of the
land only, a purchase of a contract right to receive rentals
under the lease, or as a purchase of the reversionary inter-
est in the building, or a combination of all three, none of
which should give rise to a depreciation deduction.
While the primary issue involved in the purchase and
death situations has been depreciation, another issue which
has arisen in these cases is that of amortization. The argu-
ment has been made that as an alternative to depreciation
on the tenant-erected building, the taxpayer who has ac-
"Federal Tax Regulation, U.S.C.C., A.N. (1961) § 1-167(a) 4.
9One author who discusses the double depreciation problem, has taken
the position that the purchaser and tenant will only be recovering their
own costs. However he recognizes that ne method by which recovery
of costs would be realized would be "in the form of a basis to offset
against the amount realized upon sale or exchange." Rubin, Depreciation
of Property Purcha8ed Subject To A Lease, 65 H:arv. L. Rev. 1134, 1148
(1952).
1 Value of the tenant erected building is not included in the landlord's
income upon termination of the lease. 26 U.S.C.A. (IRC 1954) § 109.
21221 F. 2d 322 (2d Cir. 1955).
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quired the fee should be allowed an amortization deduction
where a favorable lease is involved.22
The Tax Court, however, has rejected the claim that
where the total rentals payable under the unexpired term
of a long term lease are greater than the fair rental value
for a like term, the taxpayer should be allowed to write
off this difference through amortization.2 3 In denying amort-
ization the Tax Court reasoned that the right to receive
rentals under a favorable lease was merely incident to the
fee and that the favorable lease was not a separate
exhaustible asset.
The 9th Circuit in the Moore case24 overruled the Tax
Court on the amortization issue and allowed the taxpayer
who acquired the property by inheritance to amortize the
favorable aspects of the lease over the remaining term of
the lease. In order to justify its conclusion that the claimed
amortization deduction was proper, the Court set up a
hypothetical purchase situation. The Court reasoned that
if a purchaser had paid an amount greater than the fair
market value of the land alone in order to acquire the right
to receive favorable rentals under a long term lease, he
could recover the premium paid for the favorable lease
under the Internal Revenue Code.23 The Court then con-
cluded that since the Code makes no distinction between a
purchase or death situation, the taxpayer who acquires
similar property by inheritance may amortize the value of
the property he received to the extent that it was greater
than the fair market value of the land alone.2
The decision of the 9th Circuit in the Moore case, how-
ever, is in conflict with an earlier decision in the 7th Cir-
cuit in Friend v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue," an-
other inheritance situation. The Court in the Friend case
would not construe the Code so as to place the executor of
the estate of a decedent in the position of a purchaser and
thus enable him to amortize the right to receive rent under
a favorable lease. The Court concluded that the Internal
Revenue Code did not give a successor of the decedent a
1 A favorable lease is one in which the rentals under the lease are
greater than the market rental value of the same property at the date
of acquisition of the lessor's interest in the property. See, Rubin, Depre-
ciation of Property Purchased Subject To A Lease, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1134(1952).
'Moore v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 15 T.C. 906 (1950);
Peters v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 4 T.C. 1236 (1945).
"207 F. 2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953).
"26 U.S.C.A. (IRC 1954) § 167(a).
Supra, n. 24, 275-277.
"119 F. 2d 969 (7th Cir. 1941).
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basis for amortization, but only a basis for determining gain
or loss.28
The direct conflict raised by the Moore and Friend cases
was again brought to light in a more recent death situation
in the 4th Circuit.29 While depreciation was denied on au-
thority of the Moore case, in that the taxpayer was held to
have acquired only such interest as the decedent had at
the time of his death, the same authority was not used to
decide the question of amortization. An irreconciliable con-
flict on the amortization issue was said to exist. The Court,
however, reasoned that the view presented in the 7th Cir-
cuit was preferable to that of the 9th Circuit in that it
eliminated the possibility of speculation in the courts in
determining rental values. They therefore denied amort-
ization.
While the conflict among the 9th, 4th, and 7th Circuits
on amortization of a favorable lease has not been clearly
presented in a purchase situation, it might be concluded
that a purchaser would be allowed to amortize a favorable
lease. Clearly the 9th Circuit indicated such a result in its
reasoning in allowing amortization to the taxpayer who
acquired the fee by inheritance. Dictum in the 7th Circuit
Friend case also indicates that the decision in that Court
might have been in favor of the taxpayer had he been a
purchaser. In the instant case the favorable lease argument
was not raised and amortization in the Bernstein0 case was
denied on the basis of insufficient proof.
By making a distinction between the purchase and
death situations in order to allow the taxpayer to depreciate
the tenant erected building, the instant case has made a
distinction where none appears to exist in the case law or
in the Internal Revenue Code. Rather than make such a
distinction, might not the better view be to deny deprecia-
tion to the purchaser of the fee, but to allow amortization
if it can be shown that a favorable lease exists? Thereby
double depreciation of the same physical property is
avoided.
JuLEs R. WILuE
226 U.S.C.A. (IRC 1954) § 1014.
Schubert v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 286 F. 2d 573 (4th Cir.
1961).
Supra, n. 14.
